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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 09-1415 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
v. 
 
KEISER McCLINTON, 
 
                                                Appellant. 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. No. 07-cr-00287-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. William J. Martini  
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 22, 2011 
 
Before:   CHAGARES, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed June 23, 2011) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Keiser McClinton appeals from his conviction in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey on charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm and 
2 
 
possessing an unregistered firearm.  He argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion in failing to admit hearsay evidence and that the case should be remanded to 
the District Court for a new trial because of that alleged error.  We are unpersuaded and 
will affirm his conviction.   
I. Background 
On January 5, 2007, Sergeant Venancio and Officers Pereira and Ramos of the 
Newark Police Department went to an apartment complex where there had been a 
shooting one week earlier.  As they approached the courtyard of the complex, Pereira saw 
two men walking toward the rear of the complex. Noticing that one of them was carrying 
a sawed-off shotgun at his left side, Pereira immediately pointed out the danger to the 
other officers.  The officers announced their status as policemen and ordered the two men 
to stop.  Instead of complying, however, the men began to run away.  
The officers pursued them toward the rear of the complex and into a stairwell.  
The man with the shotgun then ran to apartment 342B, pounded on the door and shouted 
“let me in.” (App. 2 at 55-56; 89-90.)  Someone opened the door and he ran inside, but  
Pereira, chasing close behind, was able to follow him into the apartment.  Upon reaching 
a bedroom, the armed man, with Pereira only three feet behind him, shoved the sawed-off 
shotgun partway beneath a bed.
1
  Pereira ordered him to show his hands and arrested him 
without further incident.  Having secured the suspect, Pereira recovered from under the 
                                              
1
 The attempt to hide the gun was only partially successful because the handle was 
still exposed. 
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bed a loaded, unregistered, twelve-gauge shotgun with a sawed-off barrel.  Meanwhile, 
the other officers chased and apprehended the other individual, whom they saw throwing 
a semi-automatic handgun on the ground near the stairwell.   
The man arrested by Pereira was later identified as McClinton.  He was 
subsequently indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(d)(1), and possessing an unregistered firearm, in violation 
of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871.  At trial, Pereira identified McClinton as the one who 
had been carrying the sawed-off shotgun and who had shoved it under the bed 
immediately before being arrested.  Ramos also identified McClinton as the individual 
that Pereira had pointed out that evening in the courtyard, and he further testified to 
seeing McClinton with the shotgun.  In addition, Barbara Rogers, a tenant of apartment 
342B who was home the night of the incident, identified McClinton as the man who was 
arrested in her apartment.
2
  
McClinton sought to introduce the testimony of his wife, Lisa Klutz, that a 
juvenile called D.R. had told her it was he, not McClinton, who hid the sawed-off 
shotgun under the bed.
3
  The Court conducted a hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of 
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 Rogers testified that McClinton had returned to Rogers’s apartment and asked her to 
testify in court that McClinton had not been in her apartment on the night of January 5, 
2007.  Though Rogers rebuffed him, McClinton appeared at the apartment two months 
later to request the same.  Rogers reported both visits to the police.  On August 6, 2007, 
McClinton’s bail was revoked as a result of those attempts to influence Rogers.    
3
 D.R. asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege and was therefore an unavailable 
witness.     
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Evidence 104 to determine whether Klutz could testify to D.R.’s confessions as a 
statement against interest under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3).
4
  At that hearing, 
Klutz testified that D.R. had twice stated that he, not McClinton, was the one who put the 
sawed-off shotgun under the bed.  According to Klutz, D.R. first made the admission on 
some unspecified day in the “winter” (App. 2 at 149), and then did so again several 
months later in the presence of his sister and Klutz while on a phone call to McClinton’s 
public defender.  Neither the public defender nor D.R.’s sister testified that D.R. had 
made those statements. 
After concluding that “the evidence … [did] not clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statement itself,” the District Court excluded Klutz’s testimony.  
(App. 2 at 207.)  The Court noted that, despite there ostensibly being witnesses to those 
statements, McClinton had failed to produce those witnesses and so had failed to provide 
any adequate corroborating evidence.  The Court also found it significant that Klutz, 
“probably the [person] most motivated” to see McClinton acquitted (App. 2 at 207), was 
                                              
4
 Rule 804(b)(3) is a hearsay exception that makes admissible an out-of-court 
statement made by one who is unavailable if:  
(A) a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have made [that statement] 
only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the 
declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to invalidate 
the declarant’s claim against someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or 
criminal liability; and  
(B) [it] is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its 
trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the 
declarant to criminal liability.  
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
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a trained security officer “familiar with the criminal process” (App. at 200), and yet had 
not informed the police of the alleged exculpatory evidence.  The Court observed that 
much of Klutz’s story about how she came to interact with D.R. seemed implausible.  
Further, after contrasting her testimony with the testimony of Rogers and the officers, the 
Court concluded that “there was absolutely no basis on which [it] could find [her claims] 
credible.”  (App. 2 at 203.) 
The trial thus proceeded without that hearsay evidence and the jury ultimately 
found McClinton guilty on both counts.  On November 17, 2007, the Court sentenced 
McClinton to 120 months’ imprisonment.  
Instead of appealing, McClinton filed an unopposed motion to vacate the judgment 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asserting, in part, that his attorney’s failure to file a timely 
notice of direct appeal amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.  His motion was 
granted, and, on February 9, 2009, the District Court issued an amended judgment which 
mirrored the initial judgment.
5
  This timely appeal followed.   
II. Discussion6 
McClinton argues that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to admit 
Klutz’s testimony of D.R.’s alleged admissions of guilt as statements against penal 
                                              
5
 Once the initial judgment was vacated McClinton could timely appeal.  The District 
Court therefore dismissed all claims raised in McClinton’s § 2255 motion without 
prejudice.  
6
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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interest under Rule 804(b)(3).  We exercise plenary review of a district court’s 
“interpretation of the rules of evidence.”  Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting Co., Inc., 
347 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2003).  However, we review for abuse of discretion a district 
court’s decision to exclude hearsay evidence.  United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 
213-14 (3d Cir. 2009).  A court abuses its discretion if its decision to exclude evidence is 
found to be “arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable.”   Id.  (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  It is the proponent of evidence that would otherwise be barred by the hearsay 
rule that carries the burden of proving the applicability of an exception.  See Idaho v. 
Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816 (1990) (“[T]he proponent of evidence presumptively barred by 
the hearsay rule … carri[es the] burden of proving that” the statements bear “sufficient 
indicia of reliability” to be admitted); United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 220 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (“The burden is on the proponent of 804(b)(3) evidence to demonstrate 
sufficient corroboration.”).  A court’s decision to exclude evidence should not be 
disturbed “unless no reasonable person would adopt the district court’s view.”  Starnes, 
583 F.3d at 214.  
Rule 804(b)(3) permits the introduction of a hearsay statement if the declarant is 
unavailable and if a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made 
the statement if it were untrue “because, when made, it was so contrary to the declarant’s 
proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to … expose the declarant to 
civil or criminal liability.”  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(A).  To be admissible, however, a 
hearsay statement “offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the declarant to 
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criminal liability” must be “supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly 
indicate its trustworthiness.”  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(B).  The purpose of the 
corroboration requirement is to “circumvent[] fabrication” of “either of the fact of the 
making of the confession or in its contents.”  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) Advisory 
Committee Note to Subdivision (b), Exception (3).   
It is undisputed that, for the purposes of Rule 804(b)(3), D.R. was unavailable and 
that a statement implicating D.R. as the one in possession of the unregistered sawed-off 
shotgun would potentially expose him to criminal liability.  What remains to be answered 
is whether it was error for the District Court to conclude that there was insufficient 
corroborating evidence to clearly indicate the statement’s trustworthiness.  See FED. R. 
EVID. 804(b)(3).   
We hold that it was not.  As the District Court found, the record reveals “little, if 
any corroboration” that D.R. even made the alleged statements.7  (App. 2 at 207.)  The 
lack of corroborating evidence is especially problematic because the statements are at 
odds with others who, unlike Klutz, were at the apartment the night McClinton was 
arrested and the sawed-off shotgun was recovered.  Other factors likewise erode any 
trustworthiness of the statements:  Klutz, as McClinton’s wife, might be biased; the 
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 We agree with the District Court that the phone record offered to corroborate Klutz’s 
claim that she handed D.R. her phone and that D.R. then told McClinton’s public 
defender that the sawed-off shotgun was his is inadequate to demonstrate that D.R. in fact 
made the statement.  We conclude that, because all the phone record establishes is that a 
phone call was made from Klutz’s phone to the public defender on that day, it gives no 
indication who made the call or what was said during the call.   
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record reveals that McClinton is not above attempting to coerce people to “come to court 
to lie for him” (App. 2 at 205), as evidenced by his attempts to have Rogers do the same; 
the circumstances surrounding the statements are vague and, according to the District 
Court, incredible; Klutz failed to report D.R.’s alleged statements to the police; and no 
one else testified in support of Klutz’s account, even though there were supposedly two 
other witnesses – one of whom was McClinton’s former attorney.  Under these 
circumstances, the District Court was clearly within its discretion in excluding the 
proffered hearsay.
8
    
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction. 
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 To the extent McClinton argues that the District Court should have applied the 
multi-factor test outlined in United States v. Bumpass, 60 F.3d 1099, 1102 (4th Cir. 
1995), we note that we have never cited to Bumpass, let alone precedentially adopted its 
multi-factor test such that it might have been an error for the District Court to fail to 
apply it.   
McClinton also argues that the District Court “failed to do a complete analysis” or 
develop Klutz’s testimony.  (Appellant’s Opening Brief at 12.) Those arguments are 
unavailing because the record reveals that the District Court engaged in an adequate 
examination of Klutz and carefully considered many factors – the lack of testimony 
corroborating the statements, the statements of three other witnesses which conflicted 
with Klutz’s statement, Klutz’s potential bias, the vague and somewhat implausible 
account of the circumstances surrounding the alleged statements, and McClinton’s prior 
attempts to undermine the veracity of testimony that would be provided at trial – before 
concluding there was insufficient evidence indicating the trustworthiness of the 
statements.   
